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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : ^RIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
ALFRED WILLIAM J. JOHNSON, : tase No. 880066 
Defendant/Appellant. : priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction against 
Alfred William J. Johnson, for Burglary, ^ felony of the second 
degree, under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and from 
the error in sentencing Mr. Johnson to a separate and consecutive 
sentence for the Habitual Criminal Count, a first degree felony, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended). A jury 
found Mr. Johnson guilty following a trial on the burglary count, 
and after Mr. Johnson waived the jury, the Court found Mr. Johnson 
guilty of Being an Habitual Criminal on December 10, 1987, in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for &alt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 29, 1987, John Sargent and his wife, 
Eleanor, left their apartment at approximately 1:00 P.M. to go out 
for lunch (R. 94 at 20). Their usual procedure when leaving the 
apartment together is for Ms. Sargent to lock the door and walk out 
ahead of Mr. Sargent who follows her and shuts the door (R. 94 at 
20) . 
The lock consists of a deadbolt and also a push button in 
the middle of the door knob that must be pushed in and twisted in 
order for the door to be locked (R. 94 at 20). 
Mr. Sargent testified that as they were leaving the 
apartment that day he pulled the door shut after seeing his wife 
lock the door. Id. Mr. Sargent did not remember whether he 
specifically checked to make sure the door was secure. Id. He did 
remember that they did not lock the deadbolt. 
At approximately 2:15 p.m. Mr. Sargent dropped his wife 
off at the University of Utah for a class, and then returned to 
their apartment (R. 94 at 21-22). As he approached his apartment, 
Mr. Sargent noticed that the door was slightly ajar (R. 94 at 22). 
He entered the apartment and saw a man, whom he later identified as 
Mr. Johnson, standing in the living room (R. 94 at 23). When 
Mr. Sargent asked him what he was doing there, Mr. Johnson explained 
that he was looking for a man named Steve Goddard and that he was in 
the wrong place (R. 94 at 23-24). He also said that he had not 
taken anything and that he would wait for Mr. Sargent to look around 
and make sure nothing was missing (R. 94 at 23). Mr. Sargent 
testified that during this initial encounter Mr. Johnson was very 
calm and conciliatory and wanted to work the situation out before he 
left (R. 94 at 35). 
Mr. Sargent told the man to stay where he was while he 
looked around to see if anything had been taken (R. 94 at 25). 
During his thorough inspection of the apartment, Mr. Sargent found 
that nothing was missing (R. 94 at 26). He did notice that his 
wife's jewelry box was open, but apparently nothing had been taken 
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from the box (R. 94 at 26). Mr. Sargent testified during 
cross-examination that he did not notice whether the box was open or 
closed when he left the apartment earlier that afternoon (R. 94 at 
42) . 
In her testimony concerning th0 box, Mrs. Sargent also 
testified that she had not "specifically" looked at the box before 
she and her husband went to lunch (R. 94 at 48). She further 
testified that the box had a thick layer of dust on it, and that 
later that afternoon when she looked at the box she noticed what 
looked like small round spots on its surface (R. 94 at 49-50). 
Concerning the spots, Detective Hutcheson of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department testified that no fingerprints could be taken 
because the surface of the box was not "appropriate enough for 
prints to be lifted" (R. 94 at 55). 
When Mr. Sargent had completed his inspection of the 
apartment, he suggested that Mr. Johnson empty his pockets (R. 94 at 
37). Mr. Johnson complied and Mr. Sargent testified that he did not 
recognize the contents of Mr. Johnson's pockets (R. 94 at 37). 
Mr. Sargent also testified that he did not see any type of burglary 
tool or even a credit card in Mr. Johnson's possession (R. 94 at 
37). Further, Mr. Johnson gave his first name when Mr. Sargent 
requested it (R. 94 at 38). After giving his name, Mr. Johnson 
asked if he could leave (R. 94 at 38). Mr. Sargent consented, and 
Mr. Johnson walked out of the apartment and down the stairs (R. 94 
at 39). 
After Mr. Johnson's departure, and prior to calling the 
police, Mr. Sargent looked through the apartment again, and found 
nothing missing (R. 94 at 40). 
Detective Hutcheson testified that based on the 
description and name he was given by Mr. Sargent, he compiled a 
photo spread from which Mr. Sargent picked out Mr. Johnson (R. 94 at 
55-56). On October 17th, Detective Hutcheson contacted Mr. Johnson 
at the Continental Beauty College and placed him under arrest (R. 94 
at 56-57). At that time Mr. Johnson freely admitted that he had 
been in the Sargents' apartment (R. 94 at 58). According to the 
detective, Mr. Johnson said it "was all a mistake" and that he had 
been looking for a Steve Goddard (R. 94 at 58-59, 63). 
After the jury had been sworn, but prior to the 
presentation of any evidence, Mr. Johnson made a motion for mistrial 
after the judge told the jury the trial was as to both counts, but 
then only read one (R. 94 at 9-10, 14). The defense reasoned that 
the jury might do "quite a bit of speculating as to why they didn't 
hear anything about the second count and what that second count 
would be for" (R. 94 at 9-14). The court denied the motion stating 
that the mentioning of the second count was no cause for "any kind 
of a speculation on the part of the jury" (R. 94 at 16). 
At the conclusion of the state's case Mr. Johnson made a 
motion to dismiss based on the paucity of evidence that the state 
presented (R. 94 at 64). Mr. Johnson asserted that the state failed 
to establish a prima facie case for burglary (R. 94 at 64). He 
further specifically asserted that the state presented no evidence 
of intent to commit a theft, an essential element of the burglary 
charge (R. 94 at 64). Mr. Johnson also contended there was nothing 
in the Sargents1 testimony which could indicate "any intent to 
commit a theft," especially when considering the testimony along 
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with "Mr. Johnson's demeanor as well as actions while he was in the 
apartment" (R. 94 at 64). The Court denied Mr. Johnson's motion to 
dismiss (R. 94 at 64). 
After being convicted of the second degree burglary, Mr. 
Johnson waived the jury for the purposes of determining whether Mr. 
Johnson was an habitual criminal (R. 94 at 17). The Court convicted 
Mr. Johnson of being an Habitual Criminal (R. 94 at 108). 
The court sentenced Mr. Johnson to one to fifteen years 
on the burglary conviction and five years to life on the habitual 
criminal conviction (R. 94 at 108). The $entences are to be served 
consecutively to one another (R. 94 at 108). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing 
to grant Mr. Johnson's motion to dismiss after the state failed to 
prove intent, an essential element of the crime of burglary. There 
was no evidence of a forced entry at the Sargents1 apartment and Mr. 
Johnson did not have any burglary tools or a credit card in his 
possession. Nothing was taken, and Mr. Johnson's demeanor was calm 
and conciliatory when confronted by an angry Mr. Sargent. This 
evidence and the surrounding circumstances presented at trial, 
cannot be considered as sufficiently pursuasive to justify an 
inference of intent. 
The trial court also committed error in failing to grant 
Mr. Johnson's motion for a mistrial after the court told the jury 
there were two charges but then only read one. The court's remark 
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focused the jury's attention on a matter which they should not have 
considered and the jury's verdict was probably influenced by the 
remark. 
Finally, the trial court erroneously sentenced 
Mr. Johnson on the habitual criminal count. The court sentenced 
Mr. Johnson to a separate and consecutive sentence for the habitual 
criminal count when the law allows for only an enhancement on the 
underlying felonies. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
MR. JOHNSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS AFTER 
THE STATE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE AN 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY. 
In order to be convicted of the crime of Burglary a 
person must (1) enter or remain unlawfully in a building and (2) 
have the specific intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended). In the present case, 
the state failed to prove the essential element of intent. 
Mr. Johnson, therefore, requests a reversal of the conviction. 
To convict Mr. Johnson of the crime charged, the 
prosecution must have introduced evidence sufficient to eliminate 
all reasonable doubts as to his innocence from the minds of the 
jurors. This basic standard is codified in Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 
(1953 as amended), which states: 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to 
be innocent until each element of the offense 
charged against him Ls proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. in absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted. 
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In State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980), Justice 
Maughan, dissenting, addressed this undisputed standard with regard 
to sufficiency arguments, concluding: 
This standard provides the basis for appellate 
review of a jury's verdict. While it is the sole 
province of the jury to assess the credibility of 
the various witnesses and determine the weight of 
the evidence, this Court must Review the sufficiency 
of the evidence upon which the jury bases its final 
determination. If the evidence presented is so 
lacking that no reasonable person could conclude it 
eliminates all reasonable doubt of the defendant's 
guilt then we must set aside the jury verdict. 
Id, at 232. 
This Court has addressed sufficiency of evidence 
requirements on numerous occasions. In St|ate v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443 (Utah 1983), the Court considered whether there was sufficient 
evidence to sustain a jury conviction for the crime of second degree 
murder. Mr. Petree claimed the State failed to prove he 
"intentionally and knowingly" caused the c^ eath of the victim. in 
considering the appropriate standard of review, the Court stated, 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted}. 
(citations omitted). Id. at 444. 
While recognizing that certain deference be granted to 
the jury verdict, the Court nevertheless cautioned that, 
In fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence 
and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary 
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean 
that the court can take a speculative leap across a 
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The 
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evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be 
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
(citations omitted). Id. at 445. 
In the present case, the failure of the State to prove 
the essential element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt means this 
Court must reverse the convictions. See State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 
48, 51 (Utah 1983) . 
In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), the 
defendant was convicted of burglary in a dwelling. On appeal the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that the surrounding circumstances in the 
case permitted the inference that the defendant entered the dwelling 
with the intent to commit a theft. _Id. at 881. The Court stated: 
The act of entering alone does not give rise to an 
inference that the actor entered with the requisite 
intent to constitute burglary. The intent to commit 
a felony, theft, or assault must be proved, or 
circumstances shown from which the intent may 
reasonably be inferred. 
Id. at 881. 
The Court went on to explain that in this case"the manner 
of entry, the odd hour, and the sudden flight upon being discovered" 
all supported the inference "that the required intent to commit 
theft or a felony was present." Id. at 881. 
In the present case, there are no surrounding 
circumstances from which a reasonable juror could have inferred the 
requisite mental state. The evidence indicated that Mr. Johnson 
told Mr. Sargent he entered the apartment by mistake (R. 94 at 24). 
Although Mr. Sargent testified that he locked the push button lock, 
such a lock is easily left open by mistake. If the Sargents did 
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lock the door, then there should have been some kind of evidence of 
a forced entry, or at least some kind of tool in Mr. Johnson's 
possession. However, Mr. Johnson did not have any burglary tools in 
his possession, nor did he have a credit card or any other item 
which could be used to pick a lock (R. 94 at 37). The time of day 
when Mr. Sargent found Mr. Johnson in the apartment was certainly 
not odd (R. 94 at 21-22). 
In addition, Mr. Johnson's amiable manner after being 
confronted by an angry Mr. Sargent supports the position that 
Mr. Johnson simply made an honest mistake (R. 94 at 35-36). In 
addition to Mr. Johnson's amiable manner and reasonable explanation 
for his presence in the apartment, Mr. Johnson had no items 
belonging to the Sargents in his possession and nothing was missing 
from the apartment (R. 94 at 37). 
The only substantive evidence against Mr. Johnson is the 
disturbance in the dust on the surface of the open jewelry box 
(R. 94 at 49-50). The Sargents do not remember noticing whether the 
box was open when they left that day (R. 94 at 26, 48). The police 
were not able to lift any prints from the surface of the box (R. 94 
at 55). Furthermore, nothing was missing from the box (R. 94 at 
26). A box which may or may not have beer) disturbed, and from which 
nothing was taken, does not rise to the level of attendant 
circumstances from which a reasonable juror could infer intent to 
commit a felony, theft, or assault. While Mr. Johnson's mere 
presence in the apartment arguable may qualify as an unlawful entry, 
an unlawful entry on its own will not "support a finding of 
intent". State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah 1986). 
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In summary, the substantive evidence and surrounding 
circumstances presented at trial, even when considered in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict, cannot be construed as 
sufficiently persuasive to justify an inference of intent. This 
Court should therefore reverse the decision of the lower Court and 
remand this case for dismissal of the charges. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
MR. JOHNSON'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AFTER THE 
COURT TOLD THE JURY THERE WERE TWO CHARGES BUT 
THEN (AFTER A SIDEBAR CONFERENCE) ONLY READ ONE. 
During voir dire, while giving a preliminary explanation 
of the case to the jury, the judge indicated Mr. Johnson was on 
trial for two charges (R. 94 at 9-10). (See Addendum A for 
transcript of the Court's statement and the subsequent motion). 
Counsel immediately requested a sidebar conference (R. 94 at 10). 
After the conference the judge told the jury that there was "one 
count entitled burglary, a second degree felony. . . ." (R. 94 at 
10) . 
Following the opening statements, Mr. Johnson moved for a 
mistrial (R. 94 at 14). He reasoned that the trial court's error in 
mentioning the second count would cause the jury to do some 
speculating "as to why they didn't hear anything about the second 
count and what that second court would be for" (R. 94 at 14). The 
prosecution argued that Mr. Johnson was not prejudiced because the 
court "did not reveal the nature of the second charge" (R. 94 at 
15). The trial court, in denying the motion, agreed with the 
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prosecution and offered to make a corrective statement, or if 
defense counsel preferred not to call attention to the statement, to 
do nothing further (R. 94 at 16). Defense counsel chose the second 
option stating that a corrective statement might "further complicate 
the matter" (R. 94 at 16). 
Speaking of the admissibility of evidence of prior 
crimes, this Court stated in State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 
1985), that the limitations on admissibility exist because of "the 
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused because of bad 
character rather than because he is shown to be guilty of the 
offenses charged." Id. at 741. The court went on to say that 
"because of this tendency, such evidence is presumed prejudicial 
and, absent a reason for the admission of the evidence other than to 
show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded". Id. at 741. 
Although the trial court did not indicate that Mr. Johnson had been 
convicted of a crime, the comment that there was more than one count 
charged probably resulted in speculation by the jury concerning the 
nature of the missing count, causing prejudice similar to that 
caused by evidence of prior crimes. 
In the context of prosecutional misconduct, this Court 
has created a test which governs "reversals for improper statements 
of counsel" State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). 
According to the test, the court must first ask whether the remarks 
"call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their verdict," and second, 
whether the jurors "under the circumstances of the particular case," 
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were probably influenced by those remarks. State v. Valdez, 513 
P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973). 
Although the instant case involves a judge's error in 
presenting information to a jury and not prosecutional misconduct, 
the test set forth in Troy is applicable by analogy. The judge 
alerted the jury to the fact that a second count existed and the 
jury was not determining guilt or innocence on that charge. The 
likely harm to Mr. Johnson as a result of the jury learning this 
inadmissible information was a conviction because of bad character 
based on the jury's knowledge that Mr. Johnson had other charges 
pending, as well as speculation as to what that charge was and the 
reason Mr. Johnson was not being tried on that count, rather than 
because he was shown to be guilty of the first count. See State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). Hence, the first prong of 
the Troy test was met in this case. 
The second part of the Troy test requires a close look at 
the circumstances of the case to determine whether the jury was 
"probably influenced by the remark". State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 
426 (Utah 1973). In State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986), 
the evidence of defendant's knowledge of the illegal use of 
electrical power was circumstantial. Id. at 400. Thus, when the 
prosecution made an improper argument during his closing argument 
directing the jury's attention "to the fact that others were 
involved in conduct similar to defendant's alleged conduct," the 
Supreme Court of Utah reversed and held that considering the 
"marginal nature" of the evidence "a reasonable likelihood exists 
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that in the absence of the prosecutor's prejudicial argument there 
might have been a different result." Id. at 400/ 403. 
The evidence in this case, was less than compelling. 
(See discussion infra at 6-9). Mr. Johnson indicated that he was in 
the Sargents1 apartment by mistake (R. 94 at 23). The only evidence 
which arguably suggested an intent to steal was the testimony 
regarding the small spots in the dust on the surface of the open 
jewelry box (R. 94 at 49-50). However, neither Mr. or Mrs. Sargent 
could remember whether the box was open or closed when they left for 
lunch that day (R. 94 at 42, 48). Where the conclusion of the 
jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence 
susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater 
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through remarks 
of counsel," State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). The 
same is true of an improper remark by the judge. 
When, as in this case, there is not "compelling proof of 
defendant's guilt," and "the jury could have found either way," (Id. 
at 437), the likelihood that the jury was influenced by the 
prejudicial remark requires reversal of the conviction and remand 
for a new trial. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING 
MR. JOHNSON TO A SEPARATE AND CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCE FOR THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL COUNT. 
Early in the trial Mr. Johnson agreed to waive the jury 
for purposes of determining whether he was an habitual criminal if 
he was convicted on Count I, the second degree burglary charge 
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(R. 94 at 17). Following the guilty verdict on Count I, Mr. Johnson 
was tried and found guilty by the Court on Count II, the habitual 
criminal charge. The court sentenced him to one to fifteen years on 
the burglary conviction and five years to life on the habitual 
criminal conviction (R. 94 at 108). The sentences were to be served 
consecutively to one another (R. 94 at 108). 
Sentencing Mr. Johnson to a separate and consecutive 
sentence based on the conviction for Being an Habitual criminal 
violates the statutory provision of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 
as amended), and the protection against double jeopardy contained in 
Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution and Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Utah's habitual criminal statute provides as follows: 
§76-8-1001. Habitual criminal—Determination.—Any 
person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and 
committed for felony offenses at least one of which 
offenses having been at least a felony of the second 
degree or a crime which, if committed within this 
state would have been a capitol felony, felony of 
the first degree or felony of the second degree, and 
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of 
at least a felony of the second degree committed in 
this state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five years 
to life. Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as 
amended). 
The habitual criminal statute, "does not create a new 
crime," rather "it merely enhances punishment." State v. Bailey, 
712 P.2d 281, 286 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 
1275, 1277 (Utah 1978)). The statute does not create a separate 
offense, "but merely prescribes the consequences to a defendant who 
is convicted of a crime after achieving a certain 'status1." People 
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v. Early, 692 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). Since the 
Habitual Criminal statute creates no separate offense, no separate 
sentence may be justified. Id. at 1121. The appropriate sanction 
is to enhance the sentence on the triggering offense. As this court 
stated in State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1986), "the fact of 
the earlier crimes aggravates the commission of the latest crime, 
warranting the imposition of a longer sentence." Id. at 287 
(quoting Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting 
Increased Sentences for Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 356, 361 n. 29 (1975) (citations omitted)). 
The sentence given Mr. Johnson by the trial court on the 
habitual criminal count is inconsistent with those cases where the 
Utah Supreme Court approved enhancement sentences, not a separate 
and consecutive sentence. E.g., State v. Bailey, supra; and State 
v. Carter, supra. Accord State v. Blevins, 697 P.2d 1253, 1258 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (ordering trial court to modify sentencing of 
persistent violator to a single, indeterminate life term for the 
triggering substantive offense); Lopez v. State, 700 P.2d 16, 17 
(Idaho 1985) (explaining that since the persistent violator statute 
does not create a new crime but only provides for the imposition of 
greater punishment for the underlying conviction, the trial court 
should not have imposed a separate sentence); and People v. Early, 
692 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (habitual criminal 
statutes merely substitute a different and more severe sentencing 
range than the penalty provided for in the underlying offense and 
not a separate sentence.) 
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In addition to violating the dictates of Utah Code Ann, 
§76-8-1001 (1953 as amended), sentencing Mr. Johnson to a separate 
and consecutive sentence violates Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitutions. 
Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution provides in 
pertinent part: 
. . . nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense." 
Furthermore, Article I, Section 9 provides in part: 
" . . . Persons arrested shall not be treated with 
unnecessary rigor." 
Mr. Johnson's rights guaranteed under those provisions of 
the Utah Constitution were violated when the trial court sentenced 
him separately and consecutively on the habitual criminal charge. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
in part " . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, . . . " Mr. Johnson's 
rights under this provision were also violated by the imposition of 
a consecutive sentence for the Habitual Criminal charge. 
The habitual criminal statutes have survived federal and 
state double jeopardy only because they merely enhance the penalty 
for the triggering conviction and do not penalize anew for earlier 
crimes. See generally State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 286-87 (Utah 
1985), and cases cited therein. As sentenced in this case, Mr. 
Johnson is being punished separately and anew for his past behavior 
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via the five years to life sentence he received on Count II for the 
habitual criminal violation. The violation of Mr. Johnson's 
constitutional rights against double jeopardy is especially visible 
where the sentence is run consecutively rather than concurrently 
with the triggering offense. A consecutive sentence will require 
that Mr. Johnson be punished in toto for the underlying offense 
which allowed for the habitual criminal conviction, before he starts 
serving his separate sentence for the habitual criminal count. The 
consecutive sentence is not an enhancement. Rather, it is a 
separate and distinct sentence which impermissibly punishes Mr. 
Johnson anew for the activity which gave r^ Lse to his prior felony 
convictions. 
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the sentence on the 
habitual criminal charge and remand the case to the district court 
with an order to correct the illegal sentence to reflect only an 
enhancement of the triggering felony and not a separate sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Johnson, 
asks this Court to reverse his convictions and to remand this case 
for dismissal of the charges or a new trial. Mr. Johnson also asks 
this Court to remand this case to district court with an order to 
correct the illegal sentence to reflect only an enhancement of the 
triggering felony and not a separate sentence. 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 qualifications to sit as jurors.) 
2 THE COURT: We need now to ask Counsel to 
3 introduce themselves and state the names of their clients, 
4 and the witnesses that might be having heard today. 
5 MR. IWASAKI: Your Honor, my name is Glenn 
6 Iwasaki, Deputy County Attorney. The witnesses that I 
7 propose to call to the stand today are present in the 
8 courtroom. As I state your name, would you please stand? 
9 John Sargent, Elie Sargeant, Detective Hutcheson, and save 
10 for rebuttal, those would be the only ones I would have 
11 today. 
12 THE COURT: Ms. Harrold? 
13 MS. HARROLD: My name is Khris Harrold, defense 
14 attorney in this case. And we anticipate calling no 
15 witnesses, other than the possibility of calling the 
16 defendant. 
17 THE COURT: And your client is? 
18 MS. HARROLD: Alfred Johnson. 
1^  I THE COURT: Thank you. Do any of you have any 
knowledge of the facts involved in this case, and in the 
event you don't know what the case is, let me do that. 
22
 This case is entitled State of Utah, plaintiff, 
*3 vs. Alfred William Johnson, Jr., defendant. Am I correct? 
2 4
 That the trial as to both counts, am I not? 
25
 MR. IWASAKI: May we approach the bench, your 
20 
21 
11
 Honor? 
2 
9 
10 
11 
THE COURT: You may. 
3
 (Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was 
4
 held at side bar.) 
* THE COURT: There is one count entitled burglary, 
6
 J a second degree felony, which in general terms, alleges 
that a burglary was committed at 1009 Second Avenue,. No. 2, 
8
 J in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 
29th, 1987, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
202 of the Utah Code; and alleges that that crime was 
committed by the defendant in entering the dwelling of 
12 I John Sargent with the intent to commit a theft 
" Is there anybody here that knows anything about 
'
4
 j this alleged crime or has heard anything about it from any 
source whatsoever prior to today? There are no hands 
raised. 
(Whereupon, the Judge conducted further voir dire 
as to who the prospective jurors were, as to their names 
and occupations, et cetera.) 
THE COURT: Do Counsel pass the jury for cause? 
MR, IWASAKI: State would pass the jury for cause, 
your Honor. 
2 3
 j MS. HARROLD: Defense would a l s o p a s s f o r c a u s e , 
24 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
25 
y o u r Honor. 
THE COURT: M l r i g h t . You may tcike your 
10 
1 preemptory challenges. 
2 (Whereupon, preemptory challengs were taken by 
3 the attorneys at this time. The panel of jurors were sworn 
4
 by the clerk.) 
5 THE COURT: Does this constitute the jury panel 
6 as chosen? 
7
 MR. IWASAKI: It is, your Honor, for the State. 
8 MS. HARROLD: It is for the defense, your Honor. 
9
 THE COURT: We'll take a very brief recess and 
10 come back, and before we do that, let me give you an 
11 admonition each time, and I'm not going to make it as fully 
12 as I will make this one. 
13 When you leave the Court, you're not to discuss 
1* the case amongst yourselves, I don't want you deciding this 
15 case until you have all of the evidence before you, so 
1^  clear down to the end of this case, every time you have a 
17 break, do not discuss the facts among yourselves, do not 
1* I disctiss whether a witness is to be believed or not believed, 
just don't discuss the case, because you can't make a valid 
decision until you have all the evidence before you, and 
*! that won't happen until just before Counsel give you their 
** final argument. So, wait until all the evidence is in 
*' before you decide it or attempt to decide it, and wait until 
*
4
 I you have had a chance to talk with your fellow jurors in 
the jury room; because at that time, you're not only free 
11 
19 
20 
25 
1 to discuss the matter, you should discuss it fully and 
2 completely; but wait until then to do it* 
3 Secondly, I don't want you to attempt to determine 
4 or find any facts out about this case, other than what you 
5 will find out in the courtroom here today. So, when 
6 you're not in the courtroom, do not discuss the case with 
1 any other person, including jurors. Don't allow anybody 
8 to come up and talk to you about it. If anybody attempts 
9 to, I want you to report it to my bailiff or my clerk or 
10 myself. 
11 And don't be in a position and try to avoid 
12 positions where you might overhear the parties or their 
13 witnesses discussing this case. I'm going to ask Counsel 
14 to try and keep their witnesses and their parties in the 
15 west end of the hall out here, and in the east end, behind 
16 that little short false wall there is some chairs and so 
17 on, where the jury can congregate and stay out of the way 
18 of the witnesses, so we don't have an intermix of witnesses 
19 and parties and attorneys and the jury. 
20 Don't discuss this matter with anybody over the 
21 telephone, even including your roommates. Just keep it 
22 under your hat until we get it decided, and after that, you 
23
 Can talk to anybody in the world you want to about it. I 
24 think that will take care of it. 
25 We'll be in recess for about seven minutes. Stay 
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1 close by. The bailiff will come and get you and we'll see 
2 if we can't get you instructed before the noon break. 
3 (Whereupon, the morning recess was taken.) 
4 THE COURT: The record will show that the jury 
5 is present in the box. Defendant is present with counsel 
6 and the State's counsel is present. 
1 You may proceed. 
8 (Whereupon, opening statements were made at this 
9 time by both Counsel.) 
10 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
11 we will now recess because there's not time to do anything 
12 meaningful before the noon break. This will give you a 
13 few extra minutes, to come back at 1:30 and that will give 
14 you that much time again. 
15 Remember my admonition and we won't go through 
16 it in detail. But don't try to learn anything about this 
17 case from anybody else. Don't discuss it with anybody, 
18 don't allow anybody to discuss it with you, and if you 
19 overhear anything inadvertently, please let either the 
20 bailiff or my clerk know, and don't make your mind up, or 
21 attempt to make any decision in this case until it is 
22 finally submitted to you for your decision. 
23 The jury will be excused and we'll be in recess 
24 until 1:30. 
25 (Whereupon, the noon recess was taken.) 
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1 THE COURT: The record should show the jury has 
2 not been called back yet. The defendant is present with 
3 counsel and the State's counsel is present. 
4 I had previously advised Counsel of my decision 
5 on the defendant's motions in limine to the effect that the 
6 convictions of the third and fourth convictions, as 
7 referred t o — 
8 1 MR. IWASAKI: '81 and '84, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Yes. I felt that those convictions 
10 could be properly used for impeachment purposes and not 
H excluded under Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence. That 
12 ought to be on the record. 
13 Now, you were going to do something? 
14 MS. HARROLD: Yes# your Honor. I have a motion 
15 of especially a consideration over tha lunch hour. The 
16 fact that as we were beginning this morning, that the 
17 mention was made of the fact that there were two counts, 
18 although what those two counts were were not articulated 
19 to the jury. But I think it creates at least a chance 
20 for the jury to do quite a bit of speculation as to why 
21 they didn't hear anything about the second count and what 
22 that second count would be for. 
23 For that reason, we would move for a mistrial 
24 at this point based on that. 
25 MR. IWASAKI: I think this Court, if it would have 
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1 gone further and read the second count as being that he 
2 was charged as a habitual criminal, there would be no 
3 basis at all to deny a motion for mistrial; however, under 
4 the circumstances as presented to the) Court today, the 
5 Court said there were two charges, an£ then I asked to 
5 approach the bench. 
7 THE COURT: Then I said something to the effect 
8 that I assumed that both were being tpied or something to 
9 that effect. The question being obviously a lot of times, 
10 you've got multiple charges and they aren't all going to 
11 be tried. Sometimes, it is not clear <£>n the Information 
12 that the one to be tried, or which ones are to be tried and 
13 which ones are not, and that was the reason I raised the 
14 question. 
15 MR. IWASAKI: I think that ihe Court did not 
16 reveal the nature of the second charge, and that the jury 
17 not knowing, that speculation aside, has no basis on which 
18 to have any prejudice against the defendant for the 
19 stating of the second charge, that of(being an habitual 
20 criminal. And that wasn't done, and so there is no error 
21 in this matter. 
22 THE COURT: I think that's true. Now, if the 
23 defense feels that in any way it wants any kind of a 
24 corrective statement or instruction to be made, I'll be 
25 glad to do that. If, on the other hand, you feel the Court 
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1 has committed error and you feel you want to leave it in 
2 for purpose of appeal, you can leave it, I don't think 
3 there was any harm done. The fact that there was more 
4 than one charge could have been—really, it is not the 
5 basis for any kind of a speculation on the part of the jury 
6 in this case, particularly when we get through trying, 
7 because all we will have talked about here is the particular 
8 charge involved. Been no indication whatsoever that there 
9 is anything else involved. 
JO As a matter of fact, the purpose of this trial, 
11 there isn't— 
12 MS. HARROLD: My preference would be to stand on 
13 the motion I just made and not ask the Court for a 
14 corrective statement that may only further complicate the 
15 matter. 
16 THE COURT: That could well do. That's why I 
17 give you the option. 
18 MS. HARROLD: That would be my preference. I 
19 still think, if I make a bad deal of this case, it's going 
20 to be based on the jury being asked to speculate about 
21 several things. The idea that further speculation is not 
22 necessary and certainly wasn't warranted may occur because 
23 of that statement, and again, I would renew my motion. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I suppose Mr. Iwasaki has to 
25 defend this record on appeal, and if he doesn't really feel 
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1 that it's a problem, I frankly don't think there was any 
2 error committed. So, I'm going to deny that motion. 
3 Very well, anything else? 
4 MR. IWASAKI: One other matter, in the event that 
5 there is a conviction resulting from the burglary, second 
6 degree, it's my understanding that Ms. Harrold, on behalf 
7 of Mr. Johnson, will waive the jury for the purposes of 
8 determining whether or not he was a habitual criminal, at 
9 that time. 
10 MS. HARROLD: That's correct|, your Honor. We 
11 would, if that in fact occurs. 
12 THE COURT: All right. Anything further out of 
13 the presence of the jury? 
14 MS. HARROLD: Nothing at this time. 
15 MR. IWASAKI: Nothing. 
16 THE COURT: Will the bailiff bring the jury in, 
17 please? 
18 THe record will show that the jury is in the 
19 box and we're ready to proceed. 
20 The State ready? 
21 MR. IWASAKI: State is, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: You may call yodr first witness. 
23 I MS. HARROLD: Your Honor, before we begin the 
24 evidence, I would move to invoke the exclusionary rule at 
25 this time. 
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